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    The Existence of God: an argument against God

    Why would a good God allow suffering? The problem of evil

    The problem of evil holds that suffering counts against an all-powerful, all-knowing, wholly good God. J. L. Mackie argued that God and evil cannot both exist; William Rowe and Paul Draper argue that suffering makes God unlikely. Philosophers such as Alvin Plantinga and John Hick answer with free will, the growth of character, and the limits of human knowledge.

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    The logical problem: can God and evil both exist?

    This version holds that God and evil cannot both exist. Its defenders are philosophers who press it, such as J. L. Mackie; its critics are philosophers who answer it, such as Alvin Plantinga, whose reply is called the free will defense.

    For the argumentAgainst the argumentWhat both sides accept

    The argument, as its defenders state it:

    1. Premise 1If God exists, God is all-powerful, all-knowing, and perfectly good.
    2. Premise 2Such a God could prevent all evil, would know how, and would want to.
    3. Premise 3Evil exists.
    4. ConclusionTherefore, God, so understood, does not exist.

    1Premise 1If God exists, God is all-powerful, all-knowing, and perfectly good.

    What both sides acceptBoth sides here discuss the God of classical theism, defined by these three attributes. Not every faith on this site describes God this way (see "Across traditions" below).1

    For the argument

    The sources used give no point here.

    Against the argument

    Against the argumentGod may not be all-powerful

    Harold Kushner, in When Bad Things Happen to Good People (1981), answers by denying that God is all-powerful: God knows of our suffering and cares, but lacks the power to prevent it. Process theists, such as David Ray Griffin, also hold that God's power is limited.12

    Reply, for the argumentA God of limited power leaves the target untouched

    Nick Trakakis, writing about Rowe's evidential argument, responds that such views do not engage it, since its target is only the God of orthodox, or classical, theism.2

    2Premise 2Such a God could prevent all evil, would know how, and would want to.

    For the argument

    For the argumentA good being prevents the evil it can

    In James Beebe's reconstruction of the case made by J. L. Mackie and H. J. McCloskey, an all-powerful God could prevent all evil, an all-knowing God would know about it and how to stop it, and a perfectly good God would want to. So if such a God existed, there would be no evil.1

    For the argumentThe free will defense limits God's power

    Some scholars object that Plantinga's reply gives up God's omnipotence, since it holds that there are things God cannot do.1

    Reply, against the argumentOmnipotence never included the impossible

    Plantinga answers that omnipotence is the power to do anything logically possible. God cannot make a round square, and for the same reason cannot make creatures who are free and yet determined always to choose the right.1

    Against the argument

    Against the argumentThe free will defense

    Alvin Plantinga argues that a world with free creatures who do more good than evil is worth more, all else being equal, than a world with no free creatures. God cannot cause free creatures to do only what is right, so he could prevent moral evil only by removing the possibility of moral good.1

    Reply, for the argumentGod could have made people who always freely do right

    Mackie and Antony Flew had argued, both in 1955, that there is no contradiction in a person freely choosing the good every time. So an all-powerful God could have made people who were free and always chose the right.1

    Reply, against the argumentWhat free creatures do is up to them

    Plantinga answers that a world with moral good is a joint venture: it depends on what free creatures would do, not on God alone. So it is possible that God could not create a world with moral good and no moral evil.12

    Reply, for the argumentHeaven and God's own freedom reopen the question

    Beebe, author of the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy's entry on the logical problem, raises two challenges. If the redeemed in heaven, or God, are free yet unable to do wrong, then free beings who never do wrong are possible, and Mackie's objection returns. Beebe calls these challenges unanswered, though he holds that they leave the defense's answer to the logical argument standing.1

    3Premise 3Evil exists.

    What both sides acceptBoth sides accept that evil and suffering exist. Philosophers distinguish moral evil, which comes from the wrong choices of free beings, from natural evil, such as disease, floods, and earthquakes.1

    For the argument

    For the argumentFree will does not explain disease and earthquakes

    Others object that natural evils, such as cancer, famine, and earthquakes, happen without anyone choosing them. So the free will defense, even if it explains moral evil, does not explain natural evil.1

    Reply, against the argumentA possible cause is enough here too

    Plantinga answers that natural evil could possibly come from the free choices of evil supernatural beings. Against an argument about what is impossible, a possible story is enough.231

    Reply, for the argumentPossible, but very improbable

    Michael Tooley, discussing theodicies that appeal to free will, grants that earthquakes, cancer, and predation among animals could possibly be caused by evil supernatural beings, but argues that the probability is extremely low.3

    Reply, against the argumentImprobable is not impossible

    Beebe notes that, because the logical argument holds that God and natural evil cannot both exist, a story that is unlikely but possible is enough to answer it. His own example is a common Jewish and Christian answer: that natural evil entered the world as part of the punishment for Adam and Eve's sin.1

    Against the argument

    The sources used give no point here.

    4ConclusionTherefore, God, so understood, does not exist.

    What both sides acceptIf the premises are true, the conclusion follows. Because the argument holds that God and evil cannot both exist, an answer to it needs to establish only that they could both exist, not that they do.1

    For the argument

    For the argumentA contradiction, not a lack of evidence

    Mackie held that the problem of evil is not merely that belief in God lacks rational support, but that the central doctrines of theism contradict one another.1

    Against the argument

    Against the argumentA defense, not a theodicy

    Plantinga offers his reply as a defense: a reason God might have, not an account of God's actual reasons. An answer that sets out to give God's actual reasons is called a theodicy.124

    Against the argumentMackie granted the point on consistency

    In The Miracle of Theism (1982), Mackie granted that the problem of evil does not establish that the central doctrines of theism are inconsistent, while doubting that this solves the problem. Chad Meister reports that by the end of the twentieth century, philosophers of religion widely held that the logical version had been answered.15

    Reply, for the argumentThe hardest cases are specific evils

    Tooley, who presses the argument, faults Plantinga for answering only abstract versions about evil in general. He holds that the strongest arguments point to specific evils, such as animals dying in forest fires or children dying slowly of cancer, and Beebe reports that discussion has moved to the evidential version, set out in the next map.31

    The evidential problem: does suffering make God unlikely?

    This version holds that the amount and kinds of suffering in the world make God's existence unlikely, though not impossible. Its defenders are philosophers who press it, such as William Rowe and Paul Draper; its critics are philosophers who answer it, such as Stephen Wykstra and John Hick.

    For the argumentAgainst the argumentWhat both sides accept

    The argument, as its defenders state it:

    1. Premise 1There is intense suffering that an all-powerful, all-knowing being could have prevented without losing a greater good or allowing an equal or worse evil.
    2. Premise 2A wholly good, all-knowing being would prevent any intense suffering it could, unless that meant losing a greater good or allowing an equal or worse evil.
    3. ConclusionTherefore, there is no all-powerful, all-knowing, wholly good being.

    1Premise 1There is intense suffering that an all-powerful, all-knowing being could have prevented without losing a greater good or allowing an equal or worse evil.

    What both sides acceptPhilosophers call suffering that no greater good requires "gratuitous." Whether any suffering is gratuitous is the main question between the two sides, and most replies to the argument target this premise.2

    For the argument

    For the argumentThe fawn and the child

    William Rowe pointed to a fawn trapped in a forest fire that suffers for days before dying, and, following Bruce Russell, to a real case from 1986 in which a young child was assaulted and murdered. He argues that no good we know of would justify God in permitting such evils, so probably none does.2

    Against the argument

    Against the argumentWe should not expect to see God's reasons

    Stephen Wykstra argues that failing to see a reason counts as evidence that there is none only if we would expect to see it. Given the gap between God's mind and ours, which he compares to the gap between a parent and a one-month-old infant, we should not expect to see God's reasons. This reply is called skeptical theism.24

    Reply, for the argumentA loving God would help sufferers understand

    Rowe answers that, unlike a chess master hiding a plan, a loving God would have strong reason to help people understand the goods for which they suffer. He also argues that on this view no evil, however horrific, could ever count against God.25

    Reply, for the argumentIt would undermine moral and religious knowledge

    Michael Almeida and Graham Oppy argue that if we cannot judge whether an evil serves a hidden good, we cannot judge whether to prevent it ourselves. Others, including Rowe, argue that skeptical theists could not rule out that God deceives them, for example about an afterlife.4

    Reply, against the argumentGod's commands still guide action

    Michael Bergmann and Michael Rea answer that God has commanded people to prevent evil, so it is reasonable for skeptical theists to prevent evils.4

    Reply, for the argumentThen how can they know God's commands?

    Stephen Maitzen and others respond that the same skepticism would leave skeptical theists unable to tell which commands said to come from God are genuine.4

    Reply, against the argumentNot every evil must serve a greater good

    Other skeptical theists, such as David James Anderson, argue that the objection misrepresents their view. Following a distinction Wykstra drew, they hold that God may permit the possibility of an evil for a good purpose, as a parent lets a child risk a low grade to learn responsibility, without each evil being needed for a greater good.4

    Against the argumentSuffering can build character

    John Hick, drawing on Irenaeus of Lyon (about 130 to 202 CE), argues that the world is a place of soul-making, where people grow in moral and spiritual character by meeting real dangers and setbacks. God leaves the world ambiguous about his existence, so that people can come to love God freely.2

    Reply, for the argumentMuch suffering builds no character

    Michael Tooley argues that soul-making does not explain animal suffering over millions of years, the suffering of young children, or suffering so great that it crushes people rather than strengthening them.3

    Reply, against the argumentThe world must allow evil, not need each one

    Supporters of the view reply that God need not intend each evil: soul-making requires a world in which such evils are possible. They add that compassion grows in response to suffering, and that growth may continue after death.5

    Against the argumentFree will and stable natural laws

    Free will theodicies hold that moral evil comes from the misuse of a freedom worth its risk. Natural law theodicies, such as Bruce Reichenbach's, hold that natural evils are unavoidable by-products of the laws that make the world regular enough for people to act in it.23

    Reply, for the argumentGod could prevent the worst harms

    Tooley and Rowe argue that, as people should stop someone from harming an innocent person, a good God would prevent the worst abuses of freedom. Tooley adds that God could have prevented great natural disasters by interventions no one would detect.23

    Against the argumentUnion with God outweighs any horror

    Marilyn McCord Adams argues, from Christian belief, that an eternal, intimate relationship with God is a good beyond comparison with any earthly evil. So even a life marked by horrendous evil can, in the end, be a great good to the one who lives it.25

    2Premise 2A wholly good, all-knowing being would prevent any intense suffering it could, unless that meant losing a greater good or allowing an equal or worse evil.

    For the argument

    For the argumentA good God would allow no pointless suffering

    Rowe took this to be the least controversial premise, and Nick Trakakis reports that the consensus seems to be that he is right. As Daniel and Frances Howard-Snyder put the intuition, if God could get what he wants without permitting a horror, there would be no reason to permit it.2

    Against the argument

    Against the argumentGod may permit some pointless evil

    Some open theists, who hold that God does not know every future free choice, argue that a God who gives creatures real freedom takes risks and may allow evils that serve no purpose. William Hasker argues that accepting this premise would be disastrous for morality.2

    Reply, for the argumentThat weakens trust in God's purposes

    Trakakis answers that open theism weakens confidence that God's purposes will succeed. He adds that the premise can be restated to cover kinds of evil rather than single events, so a world with some chance in it still faces the argument.2

    3ConclusionTherefore, there is no all-powerful, all-knowing, wholly good being.

    What both sides acceptThe argument is valid: if both premises are true, the conclusion follows. Rowe does not hold that the first premise is certain, only that it is probably true, so the conclusion is offered as probable, not certain.2

    For the argument

    For the argumentIndifference explains pain and pleasure better

    Paul Draper, inspired by David Hume, argues that the pattern of pain and pleasure on earth is more likely if no good or evil nonhuman person shaped the lot of sentient beings than if God exists. Unless theism starts out more probable than this rival hypothesis, he concludes, it is more likely false than true.35

    Reply, against the argumentWe cannot judge those probabilities

    Peter van Inwagen answers that, for all we know, any world with complex life would have laws much like ours, so we cannot say that God's existence makes our world's pain less likely. Others add that evidence such as religious experience may tip the balance back.53

    Reply, for the argumentA simpler rival remains

    Tooley finds van Inwagen's conditions for describing a possible world implausible. He argues that the comparison can be restated with an indifferent creator, which he holds is a simpler explanation than a good God whose reasons lie beyond our view.3

    Against the argument

    Against the argumentTurn the argument around

    A theist with stronger grounds for believing in God than for believing that some evil is pointless can run the argument in reverse: God exists, so no evil is pointless. Rowe called this move, named for the philosopher G. E. Moore, the theist's best response.2

    Reply, for the argumentArguments for God may not reach a good God

    Trakakis answers that the evidence theists usually cite, such as the cosmological and design arguments, either does not aim to establish that God is perfectly good or faces serious difficulties in doing so. So it may not outweigh the evidence from evil.2

    Where does the argument come from?

    The problem is ancient, and it took its modern logical and evidential forms in the twentieth century.52 The early Christian writer Lactantius attributes to the Greek philosopher Epicurus (341 to 270 BCE) a dilemma: God either wants to remove evils and cannot, or can and does not want to, or neither, or both, and if both, where do evils come from?65 Lactantius answered that God permits evils because wisdom, which leads people to know God, requires knowing evil.6 In David Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779), the character Philo restates Epicurus's questions and says they are still unanswered.73

    Other traditions raised the same objection in their own terms. The Brahma Sutra, the text that every school of Vedanta seeks to interpret, takes up the charge that a Lord who made some beings happy and others miserable would be partial and cruel, and answers it.89 In his case against a sovereign creator, the Buddhist philosopher Vasubandhu (about 400 to 480; the Stanford Encyclopedia's entry places him in the fourth to fifth century) mocked the idea that a God worthy of praise could be content with the suffering of living beings.1011 For medieval Muslim philosophers and theologians, God's existence was never in question; they asked instead what evil is, whether this is the best possible world, and how evil fits with God's justice and power.12

    The modern logical version came from J. L. Mackie's "Evil and Omnipotence" (1955), H. J. McCloskey's "God and Evil" (1960), and H. D. Aiken.3 Alvin Plantinga answered with the free will defense, in The Nature of Necessity (1974) and God, Freedom, and Evil.13 William Rowe's "The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism" (1979) gave the evidential version its best-known form, and Paul Draper's "Pain and Pleasure: An Evidential Problem for Theists" (1989) gave it a comparative form, inspired by Hume.23

    Across traditions

    Each faith on this site has its own account of suffering, and the accounts differ partly because the faiths differ about God.

    Buddhism. Nyanaponika Thera, reading the discourses of the Pali canon, holds that the idea of an eternal, all-powerful creator god is incompatible with the Buddha's teachings, which aim instead at Nibbana (nirvana), the final ending of suffering, a goal people can reach by their own efforts.13 In one discourse, the Buddha rejects three views: that everything a person feels, pleasant or painful, comes from past deeds, from God's creation, or from no cause at all, since each would leave no reason to strive to do right.14 He then teaches the four noble truths: suffering, its origin, its ending, and the path to its ending (Numbered Discourses 3.61).14 Vasubandhu's case against a creator, noted above, rests mainly on arguments about causation.10

    Christianity. Christian thinkers supply several of the answers on the maps above. Augustine, in the fifth century CE, held that evil is not a thing God made but a privation, a lack of the good, and that both moral and natural evil entered the world through the misuse of free will by angels and humans.5 John Hick's account of soul-making draws on Irenaeus.2 Marilyn McCord Adams and Eleonore Stump answer from specifically Christian beliefs: Adams from the hope of eternal union with God, and Stump from personal encounters with God, such as Job's, read through the thought of Thomas Aquinas.5

    Hinduism. Chad Meister notes that Hindu and Buddhist accounts of suffering rest on karma, the law by which actions bring good or bad results in this life or another, and on rebirth.5 The Brahma Sutra (2.1.34) answers the charge of partiality and cruelty by holding that the Lord creates with regard to the merit and demerit of beings' past deeds.915 Shankara, the classical teacher of Advaita Vedanta, compares the Lord to rain, which falls alike on rice and barley while each grows by its own hidden potential.916 Asked how the first creation could depend on deeds, he answers that the round of rebirth has no beginning (2.1.35).17 Ramanuja (traditionally dated 1017 to 1137), who gave philosophical form to the Sri Vaishnava tradition of devotion to Vishnu and who affirmed a morally perfect, all-knowing, all-powerful God, gives the same answer.815 He cites an Upanishad's teaching that good deeds make a person good and bad deeds make a person bad.15 Nyaya philosophers, who argued for God's existence, held that karma, being insentient, works only when a conscious agent, God, guides it.18

    Islam. Medieval Muslim theologians and philosophers gave several answers, which Jon McGinnis and Rahim Acar survey.12 Al-Ash'ari (died 935 or 936), founder of the Ash'arite school of theology, seems early in his career to have stressed God's absolute control: the world is God's property, and the ethical rules that bind humans do not bind God.12 Mu'tazilite theologians held that God, being just, has reasons for any suffering he causes, such as compensation, admonition, punishment, benefit, or grace, and that God does what is best.12 Avicenna (Ibn Sina) treated evil as a lack of being, and held that suffering in the world of physical change is the unavoidable side of real goods, such as fire's power to burn.12 Al-Ghazali argued that this is the best of all possible worlds.12 Twelver Shia theology, Seyyed Hossein Nasr writes, differs from Sunni theology in stressing justice ('adl) as part of God's very nature, and it counts justice among the principles of religion.19 The Shia scholar Murtada Mutahhari, drawing on Islamic philosophers and especially Mulla Sadra, argues that evils are not real existing things that would need a creator of their own: evil is an absence, or is relative.2021 He offers this first as an answer to dualists and then, developed further, to those who find fault with God's justice.20

    Judaism. Jewish thinkers have answered in several ways. The Book of Job, in the Tanakh (the Hebrew Bible), tells of a righteous man struck by disaster, whose friends insist that he must have sinned while he holds that his suffering is undeserved.22 At the end, God tells the friends that they have not spoken rightly of him, as Job has (Job 42:7).23 Moshe Greenberg, in his introduction to the Jewish Publication Society's translation of Job, reads the book as challenging the principle, stated most simply in Proverbs, that each person is justly rewarded or punished.22 Maimonides (1138 to 1204) traced Job's perplexity to incomplete understanding: Job was morally upright, but with fuller understanding he would have seen that divine providence orders all things for the best.24 Eliezer Berkovits (born 1908), writing after the Holocaust, drew on the biblical idea of hester panim, the hiding of God's face: to make human beings free and responsible, God limits his own activity in the world, and so must allow evil and injustice.25 The Conservative movement's statement of principles, Emet Ve-Emunah (1988), reads the Book of Job as concluding that human beings cannot fully understand God and his ways, and holds that no theology can justify the slaughter of the innocent.26 It traces much suffering to the misuse of free will, firmly rejects the view that the Holocaust punished its victims' sins, and calls the reasons for natural disaster and genetic disease a mystery.26 The rabbi Harold Kushner, in a best-selling book, holds that God knows of human suffering and cares, but is not all-powerful and so cannot prevent it.1

    The Latter-day Saint faith. A Latter-day Saint answer starts from the faith's teaching on creation: Joseph Smith rejected creation out of nothing and taught that God organized the universe out of existing elements.27 The philosopher David L. Paulsen, writing in BYU Studies, argues that this changes the logical problem of evil.28 In his reading of Joseph Smith, matter, intelligences, and lawlike principles are as eternal as God, and he reads the Book of Mormon (2 Nephi 2) as reason to reject the classical definition of omnipotence.28 God's power, as Paulsen defines it following B. H. Roberts, is then the power to bring about whatever is consistent with the natures of these eternal things, so God cannot prevent evil without preventing greater goods, such as soul-making and joy, and it no longer follows that God is responsible for all evil.28 On these premises, Paulsen holds, the strictly logical problem is dissolved.28 The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints teaches that, in a council before birth, God's children learned that they would face sickness, pain, sorrow, and death, and understood these trials as given for their experience and good.29

    Where does the debate stand?

    The literature reports a shift of attention from the logical version to the evidential one.1 On the logical version, Meister reports wide agreement among philosophers of religion that it has been answered, while Tooley holds that Plantinga answered only its most abstract forms.53 On the evidential version, Trakakis concludes that Rowe's argument is harder to refute than is often assumed, and Meister counts it among the central arguments against theism.25 Skeptical theists, among them Wykstra, William Alston, Plantinga, van Inwagen, Bergmann, and Daniel Howard-Snyder, argue that our limited grasp of God's plans undermines or greatly weakens arguments from evil, while Rowe, Almeida, Oppy, and others dispute their view.4 Theists also differ among themselves about theodicy: Richard Swinburne holds that the required theodicy can be provided, while Plantinga doubts that we can see God's reasons for any specific evil.3

    Common questions

    What is the problem of evil?

    The problem of evil holds that suffering counts against an all-powerful, all-knowing, wholly good God. Its logical version argues that God and evil cannot both exist. Its evidential version, defended by William Rowe and Paul Draper, argues that the amount and kinds of suffering make God's existence unlikely, though not impossible.

    What is the free will defense?

    The free will defense is Alvin Plantinga's answer to the logical problem. It holds that a world with free creatures who do more good than evil is worth more, all else being equal, than a world without them, and that God cannot make free creatures do only what is right. It offers a possible reason, not God's actual one.

    What is skeptical theism?

    Skeptical theism is a reply to the evidential problem of evil, set out by Stephen Wykstra in 1984. It holds that, given the gap between God's mind and ours, we should not expect to see God's reasons for permitting suffering. William Rowe answers that a loving God would have strong reason to help sufferers understand those reasons.

    Read next

    Sources

    1. James R. Beebe. Logical Problem of Evil. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    2. Nick Trakakis. The Evidential Problem of Evil. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, sections on defence and theodicy, and soul-making. Accessed 2026-10-28.
    3. Michael Tooley. The Problem of Evil. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2015. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    4. Timothy Perrine. Skeptical Theism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2023. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    5. Chad Meister. Philosophy of Religion. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    6. Lactantius. On the Anger of God, chapter 13. New Advent (from Ante-Nicene Fathers, volume 7, translated by William Fletcher, 1886), 1886, chapter 13. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    7. David Hume. Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Part 10. Hume Texts Online, 1779, Part 10. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    8. Shyam Ranganathan. Ramanuja. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Accessed 2026-10-29.
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    10. Jonathan C. Gold. Vasubandhu. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2021. Accessed 2026-11-20.
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    15. George Thibaut (translator). The Vedanta-Sutras with the Commentary of Ramanuja (Sacred Books of the East, volume 48): Sutra 2.1.34. Clarendon Press, 1904; text read at Wisdom Library, 1904, Brahma Sutra 2.1.34. Accessed 2026-10-29.
    16. Sangeetha Menon. Advaita Vedanta. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Accessed 2026-10-29.
    17. George Thibaut (translator). The Vedanta-Sutras with the Commentary by Sankaracarya, part 1 (Sacred Books of the East, volume 34): Sutra 2.1.35. Clarendon Press, 1890; text read at Wisdom Library, 1890, Brahma Sutra 2.1.35. Accessed 2026-10-29.
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    20. Murtada Mutahhari, trans. Murtaza Alidina. Divine Justice, excerpt "Evils". Al-Islam.org. Accessed 2026-10-28.
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    25. Tamir Granot. Faith and the Holocaust, Lesson 42: Rabbi Eliezer Berkovits, Faith after the Holocaust: Divine Providence and Free Choice (part I). Yeshivat Har Etzion, 2015. Accessed 2026-10-28.
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    27. Becoming Like God, Gospel Topics Essays. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2016. Accessed 2026-11-03.
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