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    The Existence of God: an argument against God

    Is the idea of God coherent?

    This argument holds that the classical idea of God, as all-powerful, all-knowing, and timeless, is inconsistent, so no such God exists. J. L. Mackie and others press its puzzles: the stone paradox, foreknowledge and freedom, and a timeless person. Critics answer that each attribute, rightly defined, is consistent, or keep God and revise one attribute.

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    The argument, step by step

    Here the argument's defenders are philosophers who press these puzzles; its critics are philosophers who answer them. Some theists accept one of the puzzles and revise that attribute rather than give up belief in God.

    For the argumentAgainst the argumentWhat both sides accept

    The argument, as its defenders state it:

    1. Premise 1No being can be all-powerful: whether or not it can make a stone too heavy for it to lift, there is something it cannot do.
    2. Premise 2If a being knows the whole future without possible error, no one acts freely.
    3. Premise 3A timeless being cannot be a person who knows what is happening now and acts in the world.
    4. ConclusionSo no being has all the attributes of the classical God, and God, so understood, does not exist.

    1Premise 1No being can be all-powerful: whether or not it can make a stone too heavy for it to lift, there is something it cannot do.

    What both sides acceptSince at least Thomas Aquinas, the Western philosophical and theological traditions have almost universally held that being all-powerful does not include doing the logically impossible, such as drawing a round square; Rene Descartes, who held otherwise, was almost alone. The stone paradox asks whether a being that is all-powerful in this narrower sense can make a stone too heavy for it to lift. Kenneth Pearce, the author of the Internet Encyclopedia's entry, notes that the argument as usually stated is not quite valid: it troubles only a being that is all-powerful at every time and by necessity, which is how God has traditionally been understood.1

    For the argument

    For the argumentEither answer leaves something God cannot do

    J. L. Mackie asked in 1955 whether an all-powerful being could make something it could not control. In the stone version, if the being cannot make a stone too heavy for it to lift, there is something it cannot do; and if it can, there is still something it cannot do, namely lift that stone.1

    Reply, against the argumentA stone God cannot lift is a contradiction

    George Mavrodes answered in 1963 that a stone too heavy for an all-powerful being to lift is an incoherent notion, so failing to make one is no lack of power. Aquinas had held that whatever implies a contradiction falls outside God's power, not from any defect in it, but because it cannot be done.12

    Reply, for the argumentMaking a stone one cannot lift is still possible

    J. L. Cowan argued in 1965 that limiting God to logically possible tasks does not solve the paradox. Pearce agrees that Mavrodes's answer overlooks something: besides the impossible task of making a stone an all-powerful being cannot lift, there are possible tasks, such as making a stone one cannot lift oneself, and the paradox still turns on these.1

    Reply, against the argumentMeasure power by what can be brought about

    Richard Swinburne argued in 1973 that defining omnipotence by the results a being can bring about, rather than the acts it can perform, defeats the paradox, though he granted that no being in time could be all-powerful by its very nature. Joshua Hoffman and Gary Rosenkrantz add that for a being that is all-powerful by nature, a stone it cannot move is impossible, and no power is needed to bring about the impossible.13

    For the argumentPower and perfect goodness cannot go together

    Nelson Pike argued in 1969 that being praiseworthy for goodness requires the power to do wrong. More generally, a being that is perfectly good by necessity could never bring about a great evil, such as every sentient creature suffering pain all its life, while an all-powerful being would have the power to, so it seems no being could be both. Pike himself kept belief in God; his view, Pearce writes, is in essence that God is only contingently morally perfect.13

    Reply, against the argumentBeing unable to do evil is not a lack of power

    Erik Wielenberg argues that God's inability to do evil comes from his moral perfection, not from any lack of power, as a strong man might fail to lift a stone only because it is too slippery to grip. Hoffman and Rosenkrantz, assuming that if God exists this is a best possible world, argue that any evil incompatible with a maximally good world is then impossible, and no agent, God included, has power over the impossible.13

    Reply, for the argumentA power that can never be used is no power

    Pearce notes that Wielenberg's analogy is still disputed, and that many philosophers of action take it as an axiom that there are no powers that necessarily go unused. The argument rests on that principle, which is still widely accepted: if a being has the power to bring about an evil, it is possible that it does.1

    Against the argument

    The sources used give no point here.

    2Premise 2If a being knows the whole future without possible error, no one acts freely.

    What both sides acceptThere is a consensus, David Hunt and Linda Zagzebski report in the Stanford Encyclopedia, that the standard form of this argument, or something close to it, is valid: if its premises are true, its conclusion follows. So the replies either reject a premise, or accept the conclusion and give up either infallible foreknowledge or free will in the strong sense usually called libertarian, which cannot hold if every choice is causally determined.4

    For the argument

    For the argumentGod's past belief fixes what you will do

    Nelson Pike set out the dilemma in 1965 in the form that started the modern debate. In Hunt and Zagzebski's example, suppose God believed yesterday, without possible error, that you will answer the phone at 9 tomorrow. Nobody can now change the past, and God's belief cannot be wrong, so you cannot do otherwise than answer; and if you cannot do otherwise, you do not act freely.4

    Reply, against the argumentGod is outside time, so he believed nothing yesterday

    Boethius held that God is not in time and has no beliefs at a time: all events are before God's mind at once, in a timeless present. Aquinas adopted this answer, comparing God to the center of a circle, equally present to every point on it, and Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann gave it an important modern defense in 1981.4

    Reply, for the argumentTimeless knowledge is just as fixed

    Zagzebski argued in 1991 that the move does not wholly escape the problem: an argument of the same shape can be built for timeless knowledge, since the timeless realm is as much out of our reach as the past.4

    Reply, against the argumentEternity is more like the present than the past

    Hunt and Zagzebski grant that our sense that the timeless realm is fixed is probably weaker than our sense that the past is, so the parallel argument is not necessarily fatal. Katherin Rogers argues that the eternal realm is like the present rather than the past, and so lacks the fixedness of the past; William Hasker has published a critique of her view.4

    Against the argument

    Against the argumentGod's past beliefs are not fixed like other past facts

    The fourteenth-century philosopher William of Ockham argued that the fixedness of the past does not apply to all of it. Marilyn Adams revived his view in 1967: God's past beliefs about the future are partly about the future, so they are soft facts about the past, not fixed in the way hard facts are. Alvin Plantinga defended the view in 1986.4

    Reply, for the argumentGod's beliefs seem as past as anything

    As John Martin Fischer notes, Adams's test made every fact soft, even that someone was sitting yesterday. Hunt and Zagzebski see a deeper obstacle: God's past beliefs seem as good a candidate for being strictly past as almost anything. Since the accounts of God's mind that would make them soft lack independent motivation, they judge it hard to avoid the conclusion that this answer is ad hoc, made up only to escape the problem.4

    Against the argumentFreedom does not require being able to do otherwise

    Augustine held that God's foreknowledge does not force the future to happen. In Harry Frankfurt's cases of 1969, a person acts on her own while a hidden device would have stopped her doing otherwise, and most commentators agree she acts freely and is responsible. If she acts freely although she could not have done otherwise, the argument's last step, that freedom requires the ability to do otherwise, fails.4

    Reply, for the argumentForeknowledge cases differ from Frankfurt's

    Some defenders of the argument hold that Frankfurt's cases are narrow exceptions, and that the principle that freedom requires alternatives should still be honored elsewhere. Zagzebski argued in 1991 that foreknowledge differs from Frankfurt's cases, since no device stands ready to intervene.4

    Reply, against the argumentForeknowledge is the better counterexample

    Hunt answers that Augustine's counterexample to the principle was foreknowledge itself, not a device: God's knowing plays no part in why you act, so you act freely even if you cannot do otherwise. On this dilemma, he argues, the fatalist conclusion fails whether or not the earlier steps succeed.4

    3Premise 3A timeless being cannot be a person who knows what is happening now and acts in the world.

    What both sides acceptWestern theists agree that God is eternal, Natalja Deng writes in the Stanford Encyclopedia, but there have been two rival views of what that means: that God is timeless, or that God is in time and exists at every time, a view usually called everlasting.5

    For the argument

    For the argumentA timeless God cannot know what time it is

    An all-knowing God would know every fact about time, including changing facts such as that it is now noon, so what God knows would keep changing, and a God who changes is in time. Norman Kretzmann pressed this objection in 1966, and Nicholas Wolterstorff and others have defended versions of it. Kretzmann himself later defended timelessness with Eleonore Stump.54

    Reply, against the argumentOn some views of time, no moment is objectively now

    Defenders of timelessness challenge one or more premises, or accept the view of time, called the B-theory, on which all times are equally real and the basic facts about time never change, so that what God knows never changes either. Paul Helm took this route in 1988.5

    Reply, for the argumentKnowing the time still means changing

    Deng, the entry's author, argues that a worry remains even on that view of time. Knowing what time it is at different times means holding different present-tense beliefs, such as the belief that it is noon now, so how one believes keeps changing, at least for anyone whose relation to time resembles ours.5

    For the argumentA timeless being could not act or be a person

    God is said to answer prayers, sustain the world, and love his creatures, all relations to a world in time, which seems to make God temporal. And persons remember, anticipate, deliberate, decide, and act. Pike, Wolterstorff, and Swinburne are among those who argue that timelessness conflicts with other properties of God, such as being a person; Wolterstorff and Swinburne conclude that God is in time.54

    Reply, against the argumentGod can relate to the world without changing

    Aquinas held that the world is related to God, but God is not related to the world. On personhood, defenders of timelessness can answer that a person need only be capable of such acts, or that there may be timeless, changeless forms of them, as Michael Murray and Michael Rea, among others, suggest.5

    Against the argument

    Against the argumentA timeless life is the more perfect life

    Perfect being theology, which reasons from God as the greatest possible being, offers an argument for timelessness: life in time brings gain and loss, an imperfect memory of the past, and mere anticipation of the future, so the most perfect being would live timelessly. Anselm of Canterbury held that God's timelessness follows from God being that than which nothing greater can be conceived.5

    Reply, for the argumentGod's life in time need not be like ours

    Defenders of a God in time, such as Ryan Mullins, can answer that God's temporal life is otherwise very unlike ours: God forgets no part of the past and already knows the future. Experiencing things one at a time, they add, is needed for goods such as enjoying music, which the most perfect being would have.5

    4ConclusionSo no being has all the attributes of the classical God, and God, so understood, does not exist.

    What both sides acceptHoffman and Rosenkrantz, who defend the classical idea of God, write that if omnipotence were found unintelligible, or incompatible with moral perfection, traditional Western theism would be false.3

    For the argument

    For the argumentEvery classical attribute faces such a charge

    Arguments for incoherence have been offered against each of the divine attributes, Chad Meister writes in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, by adherents of theism and by others. Some philosophers conclude that omnipotence as traditionally defined is incoherent, or that God, if God exists, is not all-knowing, since people act freely.6

    Reply, against the argumentEach attribute also has its defenders

    Meister adds that contemporary philosophers and theologians defend each of the classical attributes as traditionally understood, and Hoffman and Rosenkrantz defend the coherence of the Anselmian idea of God as a maximally great being.63

    Against the argument

    Against the argumentRevise the attribute, not belief in God

    Another answer revises the attribute rather than belief in God. P. T. Geach, Wes Morriston, and Eric Funkhouser argue that if the two clash, omnipotence, not perfect goodness, should be dropped from the idea of God. Open theists such as Clark Pinnock and William Hasker hold that God does not infallibly know future free choices, and that a God who takes risks is more faithful to scripture. Wolterstorff argues that God is in time.145

    Where does the argument come from?

    Thinkers within the faiths have debated these puzzles for many centuries. In the Middle Ages the discussion included Christian, Jewish, and Islamic thinkers.54 On God's power, Aquinas (about 1225 to 1274) and the Jewish philosopher Maimonides (1138 to 1204) held that a power to bring about anything whatever, even the impossible, is an incoherent idea. Descartes, by contrast, seems to have held that God can do even that.378 Mackie asked whether an all-powerful being could make something it could not control in "Evil and Omnipotence" (1955). The article argues that it is incoherent to suppose that a world containing evil was made by an all-powerful and perfectly good being.1

    The classic statements of God's timeless eternity are in the Confessions of Augustine (354 to 430), Book 11, and The Consolation of Philosophy by Boethius (480 to about 525), Book 5. Boethius defines eternity as the whole of an endless life possessed completely and all at once, and he uses this view to answer the puzzle of foreknowledge.5 Philo of Alexandria (about 25 BCE to 40 CE) is thought to have been the first to call the God of the Hebrew Bible timeless. Anselm of Canterbury (about 1033 to 1109), Aquinas, and Maimonides held versions of the view.56

    The modern debate over foreknowledge took shape after Pike's article of 1965. It set out the dilemma in a way that produced an enormous body of work on both sides.4

    Across traditions

    Much of the criticism of the idea of God, Meister notes, has focused on God as Judaism, Christianity, and Islam understand him. It also bears on theistic elements in Mahayana Buddhism and Hinduism, among other traditions.6 The faiths below differ in how fully they share the classical idea, and several have their own debates over these puzzles.

    The Buddhist philosophers Vasubandhu (about 400 to 480) and Santaraksita (about 725 to 788) argued that a changeless God could not create a changing world.9 Vasubandhu, as Richard Hayes reads him, held that God's intentions could become actions only through some change.9 Since a changeless God cannot change, whatever brought that change about would be the creator instead.9 Santaraksita carried the point to knowledge.9 A changeless God who knew each event as it happened would have many separate acts of knowing and lose his unity.9 One who knew all events at once would miss their sequence, as a melody is lost when all its notes sound together.9

    Most of the classic answers on the map come from Christian thinkers, and Christians still divide over these questions. Jonathan Edwards based his Calvinist denial of libertarian free will partly on a version of the foreknowledge argument, while open theists give up infallible foreknowledge instead.4 Christian defenders of timelessness face a puzzle of their own, Hunt and Zagzebski note.4 Even if God is outside time, Jesus, whom these Christians hold to be God incarnate, lived in time.4 If his knowledge was infallible, his prediction that Peter would deny him raises the problem again.4 Timothy Pawl defends the freedom of Jesus's created, human will together with his infallible foreknowledge.4

    In Hinduism, the Nyaya school takes God (Ishvara) to be the intelligent agent who directs insentient matter, atoms, and karma.10 Advaita Vedanta, the nondualist school, holds that Brahman, the ultimate reality, is in itself without qualities (nirguna).11 Indirectly, within the world of experience, it can be experienced as a personal Lord with qualities (saguna).11 Ramanuja (1017 to 1137 by traditional accounts) and Madhva, a thirteenth-century philosopher, rejected an attributeless Brahman, and held that Brahman, whom they identified with Vishnu, has attributes.1213 Writing as an outside scholar of the devotional (bhakti) traditions, John B. Carman conveys their meaning through a theological question.14 How can the infinite Lord be independent of all finite reality and yet depend on his devotees? Most devotees, he writes, affirm both.14

    Muslim theologians debated how God's many attributes, such as knowledge, power, and will, fit with God's oneness.15 The Mu'tazilites held that the attributes are not distinct from God himself, since distinct eternal attributes would mean many divine beings.15 The Ash'arites and Maturidites held that they are distinct, and had to show that this does not break God's oneness.15

    On God's knowledge, al-Ghazali (about 1056 to 1111) counted among three teachings of Avicenna (Ibn Sina, about 980 to 1037) that amount to unbelief the view that God knows only classes of things, not individuals and their circumstances.1617 Ibn Rushd (Averroes, 1126 to 1198) answered that God knows the world in his own way, as its cause, neither as universals nor as particulars.18

    In Judaism, Maimonides held that we cannot say what God is: statements about God are best read as negations, or as descriptions of the effects of God's actions.8 To call God powerful means that God does not lack power, or have it in any way comparable to other things.8 God's knowledge, he wrote, has nothing in common with ours but the name, and incongruities follow when we imagine that what belongs to our knowledge belongs to God's.19 He also insisted that human beings have free will, without which the commandments of the Law would be in vain.19

    The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints teaches that "God and Jesus Christ are glorified, physical beings," a belief in which, it says, Latter-day Saints differ from other Christians.20 Its essay "Becoming Like God" notes that the earliest Latter-day Saints came from a society dominated by English-speaking Protestants.21 Most of those Protestants, the essay says, accepted the Westminster Confession's definition of God as a being "without body, parts, or passions," while Joseph Smith's revelations diverged from the prevailing ideas of the time.21 In BYU Studies, David L. Paulsen, then a professor of philosophy at Brigham Young University, holds that, if his reading of the Book of Mormon is correct, the classical definition of omnipotence should be rejected.22 In its place he favors B. H. Roberts's proposal, "the power to bring about any state of affairs consistent with the natures of eternal existences."22

    Where does the debate stand?

    Philosophers of the first rank argue on both sides: Meister writes that some argue today that theism is coherent, while others of equal stature argue that it is incoherent.6 Each classical attribute has been challenged, by theists as well as others, and each also has contemporary defenders as traditionally understood.6 On time, Deng records a notable recent shift away from divine timelessness.5 Open theists, Hunt and Zagzebski note, reject timelessness along with infallible foreknowledge.4 Stump and Kretzmann, Brian Leftow, and Helm are among the defenders of timelessness.45

    Common questions

    What is the stone paradox?

    The stone paradox asks whether an all-powerful being can make a stone too heavy for it to lift. Either answer seems to leave something it cannot do. Replies hold that being all-powerful does not include doing the impossible, or define power by the results a being can bring about rather than by the acts it can perform.

    Does God's foreknowledge rule out free will?

    Nelson Pike argued that if God believed yesterday, without possible error, what you will do tomorrow, you cannot do otherwise, and so you are not free. Replies include Boethius's view that God is outside time, Ockham's view that God's past beliefs are not fixed, and the view that freedom does not require being able to do otherwise.

    Can a timeless God be a person?

    Critics of timelessness argue that a timeless God could not know the time, act in the world, or deliberate as persons do. Defenders of timelessness answer, with Aquinas, that the world is related to God but God is not related to it, or that there may be timeless forms of such acts. Others hold that God is in time.

    Read next

    Sources

    1. Kenneth L. Pearce. Omnipotence. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    2. Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologiae, First Part, Question 25 (The Power of God). New Advent (Fathers of the English Dominican Province translation, second revised edition, 1920), 1920. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    3. Joshua Hoffman and Gary Rosenkrantz. Omnipotence. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2026. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    4. David Hunt and Linda Zagzebski. Foreknowledge and Free Will. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2026. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    5. Natalja Deng. Eternity in Christian Thought. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2023. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    6. Chad Meister. Philosophy of Religion. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    7. Robert Pasnau. Thomas Aquinas. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2022. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    8. Kenneth Seeskin. Maimonides. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2024. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    9. Richard P. Hayes. Principled Atheism in the Buddhist Scholastic Tradition. Journal of Indian Philosophy 16 (1988), pages 5 to 28 (author's copy, University of New Mexico), 1988. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    10. Matthew R. Dasti. Nyaya. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, introduction and section 3. Accessed 2026-10-29.
    11. Sangeetha Menon. Advaita Vedanta. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Accessed 2026-10-29.
    12. Shyam Ranganathan. Ramanuja. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Accessed 2026-10-29.
    13. Valerie Stoker. Madhva (1238-1317). Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Accessed 2026-10-29.
    14. John B. Carman. Bhakti. Encyclopedia of Religion (Gale), via Encyclopedia.com, 1987. Accessed 2026-10-29.
    15. Jon McGinnis and Rahim Acar. Arabic and Islamic Philosophy of Religion. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2023. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    16. Frank Griffel. al-Ghazali. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2026. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    17. Bruce Reichenbach. Cosmological Argument. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2026. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    18. Fouad Ben Ahmed and Robert Pasnau. Ibn Rushd [Averroes]. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2025. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    19. Jonathan Jacobs. Maimonides (1138 to 1204). Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    20. Godhead, Topics and Questions. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2023. Accessed 2026-11-04.
    21. Becoming Like God, Gospel Topics Essays. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2016. Accessed 2026-11-03.
    22. David L. Paulsen. Joseph Smith and the Problem of Evil. BYU Studies 39, number 1, page 53, section "The Logical Problem of Evil". Accessed 2026-11-20.